

17-1085-cv  
O'Donnell v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.

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In the  
United States Court of Appeals  
For the Second Circuit

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August Term 2017

Argued: October 25, 2017  
Decided: April 10, 2018

No. 17-1085-cv

RICHARD O'DONNELL, on behalf of himself and all others similarly  
situated,  
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*

*v.*

AXA EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,  
*Defendant-Appellee.*

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Southern District of New York  
Vernon S. Broderick, District Judge, Presiding.

Before: JACOBS, SACK, AND PARKER, *Circuit Judges.*

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A variable annuity policy holder brought a putative class  
action in state court alleging a breach of contract by an insurance  
company when it introduced a volatility management strategy to the  
policies without full compliance with state law. The insurance

1 company, citing an alleged misrepresentation to a state regulator,  
2 removed the case to federal court where it sought dismissal. The  
3 United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,  
4 (Broderick, J.), granted dismissal, concluding that the Securities  
5 Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) precluded the suit. The  
6 variable annuity holder appeals. We conclude that a holder's  
7 passive retention of a security following a misrepresentation of  
8 which the holder is unaware lacks the "in connection with"  
9 requirement for SLUSA preclusion. Accordingly, we **REVERSE** the  
10 judgment of the District Court and **REMAND** with instructions to  
11 remand the case to Connecticut state court.

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14 JOEL C. FEFFER AND DANIELLA QUITT, Harwood  
15 Feffer LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-  
16 Appellant.

17

18 JAY B. KASNER AND KURT WM. HEMR, Skadden,  
19 Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York, NY,  
20 for Defendant-Appellee.

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23 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, *Circuit Judge*:

24 The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998  
25 ("SLUSA") precludes plaintiffs from bringing certain class actions in  
26 state court that allege fraud in connection with the purchase or sale  
27 of nationally traded securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1). In this  
28 putative class action, plaintiff-appellant Richard T. O'Donnell sues  
29 on behalf of himself and other variable annuity holders as customers  
30 of defendant-appellee AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co. ("AXA").  
31 O'Donnell alleges that AXA implemented a volatility management

1 strategy for its variable annuity policies in breach of its contractual  
2 duties to him and the other variable annuity holders.

3 If SLUSA is applicable, then O'Donnell would be barred from  
4 maintaining this class action in state court and the action would be  
5 removable to federal court where it must be dismissed. 15 U.S.C. §  
6 78bb(f)(1). In seeking state regulatory approval for the  
7 implementation of the volatility management strategy, AXA was  
8 charged with misleading the New York State Department of  
9 Financial Services ("DFS"), and eventually reached a settlement with  
10 that department. On this ground, the Appellee removed this action  
11 to federal court, arguing—solely for the purpose of SLUSA removal  
12 and dismissal—that O'Donnell's breach of contract action depends  
13 on a misrepresentation (AXA's alleged misrepresentation to the  
14 New York state regulator). In this vein, AXA argues, the alleged  
15 misrepresentation was made in connection with the purchase or sale  
16 of a SLUSA-covered security, and, thus, SLUSA preclusion applies.  
17 The action was eventually transferred to the United States District  
18 Court for the Southern District of New York (Broderick, J.) which  
19 dismissed it. *See O'Donnell v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.*, No. 15-CV-  
20 9488 (VSB), 2017 WL 1194479 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017).



1 characteristics of both insurance products and investment  
2 securities.” *Id.* at 105 (citation omitted). Unlike the beneficiary of a  
3 fixed annuity, the beneficiary of a variable annuity bears the  
4 investment risk of the underlying securities. *Id.* Moreover, because  
5 the level of benefits is not fixed, but will vary depending on the  
6 investment portfolio, many consumers use variable annuities as a  
7 tool for accumulating greater retirement funds by exposing  
8 themselves to greater market risk. *Id.* Variable annuities are sold  
9 primarily by insurance companies and must be offered through  
10 “separate accounts” that are registered with the Securities and  
11 Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940.<sup>2</sup>  
12 *Id.*

13 The policy that O’Donnell purchased allowed him to allocate  
14 his premiums among various investment options with different risk-  
15 reward characteristics. Specifically, O’Donnell invested value in  
16 AXA’s “Separate Account No. 49.” JA 97. When O’Donnell

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<sup>2</sup> The Investment Act of 1940 defines a “separate account” as “an account established and maintained by an insurance company pursuant to the laws of any State or territory of the United States, or of Canada or any province thereof, under which income, gains and losses, whether or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, are, in accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged against such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of the insurance company.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(37).

1 purchased his variable annuity, he agreed and acknowledged that if  
2 he chose to invest his account value in Separate Account No.  
3 49—rather than electing to receive interest at a rate declared by  
4 AXA—he would incur investment risk and investment results  
5 would not be guaranteed by AXA. *Id.* 419. However, O’Donnell’s  
6 policy allowed him to purchase for an additional premium a  
7 guarantee that certain benefits would increase by a minimum  
8 percentage each year. This guarantee, combined with policy reset  
9 provisions, effectively reduced the volatility risks to which he  
10 otherwise would have been exposed.

11 O’Donnell’s policy provided that AXA may invest the assets  
12 in the separate account in its discretion, as “permitted by applicable  
13 law.” JA 110. Also “subject to compliance with applicable law,” the  
14 policy permitted AXA to make certain material changes to the  
15 accounts. *Id.* 113. For any changes that AXA planned to make to its  
16 separate accounts, New York Insurance Law Section 4240(e)  
17 required AXA to file with the DFS a request to amend and restate its  
18 plans of operation. *Id.* Finally, the policy provided that “[i]f the  
19 exercise of these rights results in a material change in the underlying

1 investment of a Separate Account,” AXA was required to notify  
2 policyholders that it had done so (as required by law). *Id.*

3 In 2009 AXA introduced a volatility management strategy  
4 designed to tactically manage equity exposure to Standard & Poor’s  
5 500 companies based on the level of volatility in the market.  
6 *Zweiman v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.*, 146 F. Supp. 3d 536, 542  
7 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). This strategy, labeled the “AXA Tactical Manager  
8 Strategy,” (the “ATM Strategy”) reduced AXA’s risks by using  
9 derivatives to hedge its own equity exposure to market volatility at  
10 the expense of the variable annuity policyholders who purchased  
11 their policies, in part, for the opportunity to benefit from market  
12 volatility. JA 40. The ATM Strategy is designed to smooth a fund’s  
13 returns during periods of high market volatility. However, the  
14 application of the ATM Strategy may limit the gains that may  
15 otherwise accrue to a policyholder’s account during periods of high  
16 volatility. *Id.*

17 The New York insurance code requires AXA to file with the  
18 DFS plans of operation which describe the investment options for  
19 each of its separate accounts. *See* N.Y. Ins. Law § 4240(e). Prior to  
20 introducing the volatility-managed investment options into AXA’s

1 separate accounts, AXA filed amended plans of operation. The DFS  
2 subsequently approved the filings, but, as explained below, later  
3 criticized AXA for misleading it as to the scope and potential effects  
4 of the strategy. JA 40. AXA also made filings with the SEC before  
5 introducing the ATM Strategy. As with many other securities  
6 offerings, the investment options in AXA's separate accounts are  
7 offered pursuant to prospectuses filed with the SEC and provided to  
8 annuity holders. *See, e.g., Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.*, 671 F.3d  
9 120 (2d Cir. 2011). A May 2009 prospectus informed annuity holders  
10 about the introduction of the volatility management strategy into  
11 certain portfolios in which O'Donnell had invested. JA 447-49.  
12 Moreover, an August 2009 prospectus supplement, applicable to  
13 O'Donnell's investments, indicated that the ATM Strategy would be  
14 "[e]ffective on or about September 1, 2009 . . . ." *Id.* 455.

15 **A. Consent Order**

16 In 2011, the DFS began investigating AXA's implementation of  
17 the ATM Strategy and, specifically, whether AXA had properly  
18 disclosed to the DFS the scope of the changes. *Id.* 38. Following its  
19 investigation, the DFS concluded that AXA failed to adequately  
20 inform it that it was implementing its ATM Strategy "in a manner



1 that substantially changed its variable annuity products.” *Id.* In  
2 March 2014, AXA settled with the DFS. *Id.* It entered into a Consent  
3 Order in which, among other things, the DFS found that AXA  
4 violated New York Insurance Law section 4240(e) by filing the plans  
5 of operation without “adequately informing and explaining to the  
6 Department the significance of the changes to the insurance  
7 product.” *Id.* 42. The DFS also found that the implementation of the  
8 ATM Strategy “effectively changed the nature of the product that  
9 the policyholders purchased, yet AXA did not explain in its filings to  
10 the Department that it was making such changes to its variable  
11 annuity products.” *Id.* 41. The DFS further found that “[t]he  
12 absence of detail and discussion in the filings regarding the  
13 significance of the implementation of the ATM Strategy had the  
14 effect of misleading the Department regarding the scope and  
15 potential effects of the ATM Strategy . . . .” *Id.* The DFS noted that it  
16 approved the filings because it was led to believe the changes were  
17 simply routine additions of funds. *Id.* The DFS concluded that had  
18 it been aware of the changes, “it may have required that the existing  
19 policyholders affirmatively opt in to the ATM Strategy.” *Id.*

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1           **B.     Proceedings Below**

2           After the entry of the Consent Order, many plaintiffs,  
3 including O'Donnell, brought putative class action suits. O'Donnell  
4 initiated this action in Connecticut state court. *O'Donnell*, 2017 WL  
5 1194479, at \*2. He alleged a breach of contract claim premised on  
6 AXA's alleged failure to comply with the terms of the policies that  
7 AXA had sold to O'Donnell and other members of the putative class.  
8 Specifically, O'Donnell alleged that, in violation of Section 4240,  
9 AXA breached the terms of the policy when it implemented the  
10 ATM Strategy without obtaining prior approval. O'Donnell  
11 purported to sue on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated  
12 variable annuity policyholders who allocated funds into separate  
13 accounts which implemented the ATM Strategy.

14           Citing, among other things, the alleged misrepresentations to  
15 the DFS, AXA removed the action to federal court (the District of  
16 Connecticut), where it successfully moved, over O'Donnell's  
17 objections, to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York.  
18 There, O'Donnell moved to remand the action to state court and  
19 AXA cross-moved to dismiss the complaint as precluded by SLUSA.  
20 *Id.*



1 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is  
2 plausible on its face. *Id.* (citing *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678  
3 (2009)).

4 We review a district court's denial of a motion to remand *de*  
5 *novvo*. *Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc.*, 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d  
6 Cir. 2004). In reviewing a denial of a motion to remand, "the  
7 defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the propriety of  
8 removal." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

### 9 III. DISCUSSION

10 Under SLUSA, covered class actions that allege state law  
11 securities fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of covered  
12 securities are removable to federal court where they there must be  
13 dismissed. *Romano v. Kazacos*, 609 F.3d 512, 517–18 (2d Cir. 2010); *see*  
14 *also Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund*, 138 S.Ct. 1061, 1067 (  
15 2018). Specifically, a class action is properly removed to federal  
16 court and dismissed where the state action is:

- 17 (1) a "covered class action";
- 18 (2) based on state statutory or common law;
- 19 (3) concerning a covered security; and

1 (4) alleging that defendants made a misrepresentation or  
2 omission of a material fact . . . in connection with the purchase  
3 or sale of that security.

4 *See* 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f). When determining whether SLUSA applies  
5 to a complaint, courts may apply the “artful pleading rule” and  
6 “look beyond the face of the . . . complaint[] to determine whether  
7 [it] allege[s] securities fraud in connection with the purchase or sale  
8 of covered securities.” *Romano*, 609 F.3d at 519; *see also In re Kingate*  
9 *Mgmt. Ltd. Litig.*, 784 F.3d at 140 (observing that “plaintiffs should  
10 not be permitted to escape SLUSA by artfully characterizing a claim  
11 as dependent on a theory other than falsity when falsity nonetheless  
12 is essential to the claim”).

13 Here, there is no dispute that the complaint meets three of  
14 SLUSA’s requirements: (1) the action is a “covered class action,” (2)  
15 the action is based on state common law, and (3) the action involves  
16 a “covered security.” Thus, the dispute before us involves the  
17 fourth requirement: whether the complaint alleges a  
18 misrepresentation or omission of material fact in connection with the  
19 purchase or sale of a security. This inquiry breaks down into two  
20 parts, both of which are required for preclusion under SLUSA: (i)

1 whether the complaint alleges a misrepresentation or omission of a  
2 material fact and (ii) if so, whether the misrepresentation or  
3 omission was made in connection with the purchase or sale of a  
4 SLUSA-covered security.

5 We conclude that the alleged misrepresentation was not made  
6 in connection with the purchase or sale of a SLUSA-covered security.  
7 Because we conclude that part two of this inquiry was not met, we  
8 need not reach the first one.

9 **A. In Connection With**

10 The District Court considered the language “in connection  
11 with” the purchase or sale of covered securities in light of *Merrill*  
12 *Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit*, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) and  
13 *Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice*, 134 S.Ct. 1058 (2014). The District  
14 Court concluded that the fraud alleged must be material to the  
15 decision to buy, sell, or hold a covered security, and if so, any claim  
16 involving such a transaction is precluded by SLUSA. *O’Donnell*,  
17 2017 WL 1194479, at \*2–3.

18 We are in accord with this view. Moreover, we also agree  
19 with the District Court that *Dabit* and *Troice* provide that so-called  
20 “holder” claims—in which the victims were fraudulently induced to

1 retain or delay selling securities—are also precluded under SLUSA.  
2 We note that in *Dabit*, however, the “holder” claim was express: the  
3 plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s “misrepresentations and  
4 manipulative tactics caused [the plaintiffs] to hold onto overvalued  
5 securities,” long after they would have otherwise sold them. 547  
6 U.S. at 75–76. The Supreme Court explained that it is enough that  
7 the fraud alleged ‘coincide’ with a securities transaction—whether  
8 by the plaintiff or by someone else. *Id.* at 85 (citing *United States v.*  
9 *O’Hagan*, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)). In *Troice*, the Supreme Court  
10 further clarified SLUSA preclusion, noting that in *Dabit*, SLUSA  
11 precluded a suit in which the alleged fraud was “material to and  
12 coincided with third-party securities transactions, while also  
13 inducing the plaintiffs to hold their stocks long beyond the point  
14 when, had the truth been known, they would have sold.” *Troice*, 134  
15 S.Ct. at 1066–67 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation  
16 omitted) (noting prior case law which involved a plaintiff who  
17 “took, tried to take, or *maintained* an ownership position . . . induced  
18 by the fraud” (emphasis added)). In short, both *Dabit* and *Troice*  
19 indicate that an inducement to action or forbearance can satisfy the  
20 “in connection with” requirement. *See id.*

1           Here, AXA invites us to conclude that O'Donnell has pled a  
2 "holder" claim in a context where the alleged misrepresentation was  
3 made to a regulator and unknown to the holders of the securities.  
4 We decline this invitation. The complaint is bereft of any allegations  
5 that an actual securities transaction ever occurred. Moreover, the  
6 complaint does not plausibly allege—nor support a reasonable  
7 inference—that any decision to hold by O'Donnell was made that  
8 was related in any way to any misstatements to the DFS. *See Troice*,  
9 134 S.Ct. at 1066–67 (highlighting materiality requirement).

10           AXA contends that O'Donnell alleges a breach of contract and  
11 an actionable misrepresentation by AXA when, in violation of New  
12 York law, in implementing the ATM strategy, it failed to properly  
13 explain the nature of the changes to the DFS. Key for SLUSA  
14 preclusion, however, the alleged misrepresentation here was by  
15 AXA to the DFS, but not by AXA to O'Donnell, or other putative  
16 class members. In fact, there is no allegation or indication that  
17 O'Donnell and the putative class members were ever aware of the  
18 misrepresentation that AXA made to the DFS.

19           Consequently, we see no link between the misrepresentation  
20 (to a regulator) and the inaction of a securities holder following



1 misrepresentations of which the holder was unaware. *Troice* brings  
2 this point home. There, the Supreme Court stated that “[a]  
3 fraudulent misrepresentation or omission is not made ‘in connection  
4 with’ such a ‘purchase or sale of a covered security’ unless it is  
5 material to a decision by one or more individuals (other than the  
6 fraudster) to buy or to sell a ‘covered security.” *Troice*, 134 S.Ct. at  
7 1066. For these reasons we conclude that the misrepresentation  
8 could not have been made “in connection with” the purchase or sale  
9 of a covered security because the misrepresentation could not have  
10 been “material to a decision by one or more individuals . . . to buy or  
11 sell a covered security,” for the simple reason that it was unknown  
12 to the them. *See id.* In other words, there is no plausible allegation  
13 in the complaint that any decision to hold a security occurred that  
14 was related in any way to AXA’s disclosures to the DFS. *Cf. Shuster*  
15 *v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.*, No. 14-8035 (RBK/JS), 2015 WL 4314378,  
16 at \*7 n.12 (D.N.J. July 14, 2015) (concluding no SLUSA preclusion  
17 where “none of the facts indicate that a decision to purchase, sell, or  
18 hold covered securities was incidental to AXA’s conduct”).

19 We recognize that in *Dabit*, the Court stated that “it is enough  
20 that the alleged fraud ‘coincide’ with a securities

1 transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else.” *Dabit*,  
2 547 U.S. at 85 (observing that “[t]he requisite showing . . . is  
3 deception in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,  
4 not deception of *an identifiable purchaser or seller*.” (internal quotation  
5 marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added)). Moreover, under  
6 the artful pleading rule, as we explained in *Romano*, courts are to  
7 look beyond the face of an “‘artfully pled’ complaint to determine  
8 whether [a] plaintiff has ‘cloth[ed] a federal law claim in state garb’  
9 by pleading state law claims that actually arise under federal law.”  
10 609 F.3d at 518 (quoting *Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian*, 794 F.2d 754,  
11 758 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also *Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc.*, 398  
12 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2005) (directing inquiry into whether a  
13 “reasonable reading of the complaint evidences allegations of a  
14 misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with  
15 the purchase or sale of a covered security” (internal quotation marks  
16 omitted)). However, here, we are satisfied, first, that a  
17 misrepresentation to a regulator and the inaction of a securities  
18 holder following a misrepresentation of which the holder is unaware  
19 did not affect the holder’s decisions with respect to holding or  
20 disposing of securities and, second, that the misrepresentation did

1 not “coincide” with a securities transaction where none is alleged to  
2 have occurred or to have been forestalled, delayed or inhibited. A  
3 contrary decision would be a bridge too far even for the artful  
4 pleading rule.

5 Finally, we note that the implementation of the ATM strategy  
6 was disclosed publicly in a May 2009 prospectus and in an August  
7 2009 supplement. AXA’s argument, however, turns on the failure to  
8 disclose changes to the DFS and not on these public disclosures.  
9 Here there is no allegation (or a reasonable inference) that, in these  
10 later disclosures, AXA misled O’Donnell or the market more  
11 generally or that the market was aware of AXA’s misrepresentation  
12 to the DFS.

#### 13 IV. CONCLUSION

14 For the forgoing reasons, we **REVERSE** the judgment of the  
15 District Court and **REMAND** with instructions to remand the case to  
16 Connecticut state court.

**United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse  
40 Foley Square  
New York, NY 10007**

**ROBERT A. KATZMANN**  
CHIEF JUDGE

Date: April 10, 2018

Docket #: 17-1085cv

Short Title: O'Donnell v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance C

**CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE**  
CLERK OF COURT

DC Docket #: 15-cv-9488

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK  
CITY)

DC Judge: Broderick

**BILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS**

The requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill of costs is on the Court's website.

The bill of costs must:

- \* be filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;
- \* be verified;
- \* be served on all adversaries;
- \* not include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;
- \* identify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;
- \* include the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a cover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;
- \* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;
- \* state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New York, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;
- \* be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.

**United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit  
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse  
40 Foley Square  
New York, NY 10007**

**ROBERT A. KATZMANN**  
CHIEF JUDGE

Date: April 10, 2018

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Short Title: O'Donnell v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance C

**CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE**  
CLERK OF COURT

DC Docket #: 15-cv-9488

DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK  
CITY)

DC Judge: Broderick

**VERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS**

Counsel for

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respectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the

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and in favor of

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for insertion in the mandate.

Docketing Fee \_\_\_\_\_

Costs of printing appendix (necessary copies \_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_

Costs of printing brief (necessary copies \_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_

Costs of printing reply brief (necessary copies \_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_

**(VERIFICATION HERE)**

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Signature