Executive Summary
- What’s new: The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. that the Helms-Burton Act authorizes recovery against anyone who uses property confiscated by the Cuban government, even if the former owners would no longer have an interest in the property today.
- Why it matters: The decision adopts an expansive view of liability under the statute and opens the door for claims by U.S. nationals who previously owned property confiscated by Cuba, even if the property interest was of finite duration.
- What to do next: Companies exploring or conducting commercial dealings in Cuba should be aware of this heightened risk of exposure under the Helms-Burton Act and should continue to monitor legislative developments in this space.
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The Helms-Burton Act permits U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government to seek compensation from persons who later “trafficked” in that property. In its May 21, 2026, decision in Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Helms-Burton Act authorizes recovery by former owners of confiscated property against anyone who subsequently uses that property, even if the former owners would no longer have an interest in the property today had the Cuban government not confiscated it. The Supreme Court’s ruling reflects an expansive view of liability under the statute.
Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act in early 1996, with the avowed aim of accelerating a return to democracy in Cuba by restricting access to its economy.1 The statute permits recovery on a showing that (i) the Cuban government confiscated property on or after January 1, 1959; (ii) the defendant trafficked in the property; and (iii) the plaintiff is a U.S. national who owns a claim to that property.2 The statute permits trebling of damages as well as recovery of attorneys’ fees.
For decades following the statute’s effective date, successive presidents suspended this private right of action. In May 2019, the first Trump administration allowed the suspension to expire, thereby permitting plaintiffs to bring claims under the Act.
Shortly thereafter, Havana Docks Corporation filed suit against four commercial cruise lines in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Havana Docks alleged that it had acquired a concession in 1928 that allowed it to develop and operate dock facilities in a state-owned port in Havana, Cuba. That concession was set to expire in 2004. In 1960, the Cuban government seized the docks without compensating Havana Docks. Decades later, from 2016 through 2019, the four cruise line defendants used the same docks to embark and disembark cruise passengers. The cruise lines’ operations had been permitted by the Obama administration, as part of its policy allowing increased tourism to Cuba. As such, these operations were exempt from U.S. sanctions.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Havana Docks and awarded it over $400 million in damages (including treble damages). The court rejected the cruise line defendants’ argument that, because Havana Docks’ concession would have expired in 2004 absent confiscation, the cruise lines’ use of the docks from 2016 through 2019 could not have infringed on Havana Docks’ use of its property. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, concluding that a defendant is liable under the Helms-Burton Act only if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have possessed had there been no confiscation.
In an 8-1 decision (with Justice Elena Kagan dissenting), the Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling and remanded for further proceedings. The Court explained that the Helms-Burton Act “generally makes those who use property tainted by a past confiscation liable to any United States national who owns a claim to that property.”3 The statute does not require that the requisite “claim” be a present property interest. Rather, “confiscated property is . . . tainted — off limits — such that anyone who uses the property can be liable to those who had an interest in the tainted property.”4 Applying this standard, the Court held that Havana Docks had established the statutory elements. Notably, the Court expressly declined to address the cruise line defendants’ additional arguments against liability — including that their conduct fell within a statutory exception for uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba, and that the district court’s damages award violated due process — leaving those questions for the Eleventh Circuit to consider on remand.
The Supreme Court’s decision adopts an expansive view of liability under the Helms-Burton Act and could presage additional suits under the statute. It opens the door for claims by U.S. nationals who previously owned property confiscated by the Cuban government, even if the property interest (e.g., a lease) was of finite duration. Companies exploring or conducting commercial dealings in Cuba should be aware of this heightened risk of exposure under the Helms-Burton Act.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, penned a concurrence that suggests some possible limits to this broad liability. They noted that the case raised a “significant question” about whether the challenged conduct fell within a statutory exception for “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba.”5 That exception might apply, the concurrence explains, given the argument, which the federal government itself has advanced, that the challenged “cruises were lawful and beneficial to both Cuba and the United States.”6 In addition, the United States’ position on the lawfulness of cruise travel could “raise due process concerns” with now imposing liability based on that conduct, as the federal government noted at oral argument.7 The Eleventh Circuit will need to address those issues on remand.
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court’s ruling will spur an increase in actions under the Helms-Burton Act. It is also possible that Congress may modify the scope of the Act or adopt it to apply to other countries viewed as hostile. Companies should continue to monitor legislative developments in this space.
Associates Katherine S. Correia and Amanda Raymond Kalantirsky contributed to this article.
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1 Public reaction to the February 24, 1996, “Hermanos al Rescate” incident, in which Cuban military forces shot down two unarmed civilian aircraft flying from the United States, accelerated passage of the Helms-Burton Act through Congress. This is the same incident that recently led the U.S. government to indict former Cuban leader Raúl Castro on homicide charges.
2 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091.
3 Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 608 U.S. ___, slip op. at 2 (2026).
4 Id., slip op. at 11.
5 Id., slip op. at 3–4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
6 Id., slip op. at 3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
7 Id., slip op. at 4 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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