Executive Summary
- What’s new: The U.S. government has instituted three separate regimes that restrict biotech dealings with China. BIOSECURE keeps Chinese biotech suppliers out of federally funded work. The Data Security Program bars sharing Americans’ genetic and health data with Chinese parties. The COINS rule, as proposed, will limit U.S. investment into Chinese biotechnology companies.
- Why it matters: These new requirements have the potential to disrupt programs that biotech companies had established in their pipelines. They are run by different agencies, use different tests and do not clear one another. The affected parties are life sciences companies doing business in the U.S.
- What to do next: Companies should consider identifying China connections across their investment portfolios, licensing deals, suppliers and data flows. They can also review vendors against the government lists, map where genetic data goes and add protective contract provisions.
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Multiple national security-related rules are impacting the biotech sector and have the potential to upend years of research and development work. Washington now treats biotechnology as a national security technology, on a par with semiconductors and AI.
Recently, the U.S. government has instituted three separate regimes to restrict biotech dealings with China. BIOSECURE keeps Chinese biotech suppliers out of federally funded work. The Data Security Program bars sharing Americans’ genetic and health data with Chinese parties. The COINS rule, as proposed, will limit U.S. investment into Chinese biotechnology companies.
Because drug development takes place over protracted periods of time, with many development programs having started five to 10 years ago, these new requirements have the potential to disrupt programs that biotech companies had established in their pipelines. The challenge of navigating compliance with these laws is significant as they are run by different agencies, use different tests and do not clear one another. A single licensing deal or supplier contract entered into years prior can implicate all three and require significant changes to development programs.
Background: The Sudden Intersection of Biotech and National Security
For most of the past decade, U.S. national security controls on China were focused on chips, telecommunications and AI. Biotechnology, or the development of new and innovative medical therapies using cutting-edge technology, largely stayed outside that frame. That has changed quickly. Policymakers now view biotech as “dual-use”: the same tools that produce new medicines can support biological weapons, military applications and surveillance. They also view large datasets of Americans’ genetic information as a strategic asset that China has sought to access through investments and research partnerships.
Because of the sudden interest in biotech from a national security standpoint, life sciences companies doing business in the U.S. find themselves in the crosshairs of three overlapping regimes. Each was built for a different purpose and is administered by a different agency. Together, they attempt to limit or curtail the influence of China on the U.S. life sciences industry via investment, manufacturing and data sharing.
Regime 1: Outbound Investment, The COINS Act (Treasury)
What it is. Since January 2, 2025, the Treasury Department has run a program, under 31 CFR Part 850, that restricts U.S. investment into Chinese companies working on sensitive technologies. It began with semiconductors, quantum computing and AI. In December 2025, Congress made the program permanent through the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security (COINS) Act and authorized Treasury to add new technology sectors. On October 26, 2026, Treasury proposed a rule and added biotechnology.
What it would cover. The scope is broad. Covered activities would include using biological systems to make pharmaceutical compounds, a category that expressly includes small molecules, vaccines, cell and gene therapies and monoclonal antibodies. Also covered would be brain-computer interfaces, certain biomanufacturing equipment, gene sequencing, bioinformatics software and laboratory automation. Biotech would sit in the prohibited category. Unlike in some other sectors, there is no middle tier where a deal may proceed if Treasury is notified.
The rule as currently written does not define “biological systems.” The breadth of the covered examples indicates that the government is defining “biological systems” very broadly, so as to include processes that only involve chemical synthesis and no biology — for example, the manufacture of small-molecule drugs. If “biological system” is read in its ordinary sense (for example, cell banks, gene vectors or proteins that are not chemically synthesized), the prohibition would fall mainly on biologics, and conventional small-molecule programs could fall largely outside the scope of the proposed rule. The inclusion of small molecules would make the program vastly more impactful on the life sciences industry, especially for global companies that have Chinese operations. Many of the comments on the proposed rule have raised concerns with the scope and the potential to hinder drug development and manufacturing by U.S. companies.
Who is affected. The rules apply to U.S. persons, including U.S. funds and companies and their foreign subsidiaries. They cover equity investments, convertible notes, joint ventures, certain loans, and stakes in non-U.S. funds that invest in China. A Chinese “covered foreign person” is defined broadly. For example, a U.S.-incorporated company whose CEO runs the business from China would qualify.
What is excluded. Investments in publicly traded securities are excluded, as are pure licensing arrangements, fund commitments of $2 million or less and full buyouts of the Chinese owners. Violations can bring civil penalties of as much as twice the transaction value, as well as forced divestment. Until a final rule is adopted, the current Part 850 rules continue to apply.
Regime 2: BIOSECURE (Federal Procurement)
What it is. The BIOSECURE provisions, enacted in the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act, are about supply chains rather than investment. BIOSECURE bars federal agencies from:
- Procuring biotechnology equipment or services from “biotechnology companies of concern” (BCCs).
- Entering into, extending or renewing contracts with entities that use BCC equipment or services in performing a federal contract.
In other words, the intent is to keep federal money away from Chinese biotech companies deemed to pose a security risk.
Under the law, “biotechnology equipment or service” means any equipment, instrument, apparatus, machine or device used in the research, development, production, analysis, detection or provision of information relating to biological material — including components, accessories, software, firmware, digital components, data storage, transmission, advising, consulting, disease detection and more. Given this breadth, third-party analytical testing, release testing and laboratory services performed on biological materials likely fall within scope if provided by a BCC. If biological materials are not involved in any of these processes, then the BIOSECURE provisions may not apply.
How it works. Federal agencies may not buy biotech equipment or services, such as gene sequencers or lab services, from a BCC. More significantly for life sciences companies that hold certain federal contracts, such as supply agreements with the Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Health and Human Services or Department of War,1 or receive federal grants or loans, if they rely on a BCC for development, manufacturing, testing, distribution, third-party analytical, release-testing or laboratory services they may no longer be able to supply product under those federal contracts or receive the grants or loans. Roughly 79% of U.S. biopharmaceutical companies rely on China-based firms for at least part of their manufacturing or supply chain. BIOSECURE has raised questions for life sciences companies that have these types of federal agreements in terms of reworking their supply chain to avoid BCCs. However, many companies have longstanding relationships with their suppliers, and depending on the activity performed, it may be highly complex, expensive and time-consuming to move away from suppliers that have may be designated as BCCs.
Timing. The government must publish its list of covered companies by December 18, 2026. The restrictions take effect only after federal contracting rules are updated, and contracts signed before then generally get a five-year transition period. Given this, there is time for life sciences companies to prepare.
Regime 3: The Data Security Program (DOJ)
What it is. Since April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has restricted transactions that give China and certain other countries access to large volumes of Americans’ sensitive personal data. For biotech, the key category is genetic and related biological data, along with the biological samples from which that data can be derived. This information is commonly collected during clinical trials or drug development.
How it works. A U.S. company may not sell, license or otherwise provide access to genetic data on more than 100 Americans to a Chinese party through a commercial arrangement. Such arrangements include vendor contracts, employment and investment. The threshold is low, and the prohibition applies even if the data is anonymized or encrypted. There are exemptions for federally funded research and for data needed in Food and Drug Administration-regulated clinical trials and drug approvals. Life sciences companies conducting global clinical trials already navigate a complex web of data privacy laws, and the low threshold of the Data Security Program puts pressure on companies’ privacy teams.
Where the Regimes Come Together and Impact the Life Sciences Sector
Because these three regimes are intended to regulate activities from a different angle, a single transaction often must be tested under all three. Let’s look at an example in which a U.S. startup licenses a clinical-stage drug from a Chinese biotech and, in return, the licensor takes an equity stake in the U.S.-based startup.
- Outbound. If the arrangement looks like a co-development joint venture, Treasury’s proposed rule could prohibit it.
- Data. If the U.S. company conducts a study in the U.S. and needs to send patient data back to the licensor, the DOJ rule may apply.
- BIOSECURE. If the startup relies on a listed Chinese manufacturer and later takes on federal work, BIOSECURE may prohibit the flow of federal funds to the startup.
Three further points are worth keeping in mind:
- The lists connect the regimes. A company named under BIOSECURE also becomes off-limits for U.S. investment under Treasury’s proposed rule for COINS. One designation can therefore cut off a company’s U.S. customers and its U.S. investors at the same time.
- Clearance under one regime does not carry over. Approval of a Chinese investment by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) does not authorize a transaction that Treasury’s outbound rule prohibits. Each regime has its own definitions of ownership, control and knowledge, so each screen must be run separately.
- Practical consequence. Until the rules are final, cash-and-royalty licensing deals look safer than structures that give a Chinese licensor equity or co-development rights in a U.S.-based company.
What Companies Should Consider Now
- Identify China connections across the company’s investment portfolio, licensing deals, suppliers and data flows.
- Review contract manufacturers, contract research organizations and sequencing vendors against the government lists, including the BIOSECURE list once it is published. If a product is subject to large federal contracts, and there are ways to change vendors, explore alternative suppliers to avoid any potential conflict and get ahead of the time needed to submit chemistry, manufacturing and controls (CMC) supplements.
- Map where genetic data and biological samples go, including to vendors, cloud providers and employees outside the U.S.
- For new contracts, add provisions that allow modification or termination if regulations change, representations on covered-foreign-person status, and supplier-change rights.
- Submit comments on COINS to Treasury by December 7, 2026, particularly on the scope of the definition of “biological system” and “pharmaceutical compounds” category.
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1 Congress has not yet acted on the Trump administration’s renaming of the Department of Defense as the Department of War.
This memorandum is provided by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws.