The Sanctions Puzzle: 10 Key Areas to Watch in 2027 and Beyond

Skadden / Key Takeaways

Jonathan Benson Brian J. Egan Eytan J. Fisch Ryan D. Junck Greg Seidner Chelsea B. Mihelich Jack Zaher

New restrictions on Iran, opportunities in Venezuela, significant Russia sanctions by the European Union and the U.K., a deepening technology contest with China and a string of enforcement actions have defined the sanctions landscape over the past 12 months.

Sanctions authorities continue to use economic sanctions as targeted foreign policy tools alongside export controls, tariffs, civil forfeiture actions, and inbound and outbound investment restrictions. As Western allies largely share strategic goals but diverge in regulatory approaches, global financial institutions and corporates must manage overlapping — and sometimes conflicting — sanctions obligations. In this note, we outline key areas to watch in the coming year.1

1. Russia remains the center of gravity for the EU and U.K. as designations reach record scale.

In October 2026, the EU adopted its largest-ever set of Russia-related designations — 1,646 new listings, including 826 entities and 743 individuals in Russia’s military-industrial complex — extending sanctions deep into midlevel industrial supply chains. Following further U.K. designations in October and November 2026, the U.K. has now sanctioned all 10 of Russia’s major oil producers and brought the number of sanctioned shadow fleet vessels to more than 600.

The EU’s 21st package in July 2026 added a transaction ban on refineries, including in third countries, that process Russian crude. The EU’s 22nd package is expected to target Russia’s oil revenue further as well as introduce new restrictions on banks, cryptocurrencies and crypto platforms. With peace negotiations ongoing, companies should be prepared to assess these new prohibitions and further designations.

2. Iran returns to the top of the U.S. agenda.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury launched “Operation Economic Outcast” on August 24, 2026, which it described as aimed at severing Iran’s remaining financial lifelines, including by extending key sanctions authorities to cover Iran’s aviation, technology, shipping and digital assets sectors.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has since designated Iran’s largest domestic cryptocurrency exchanges and indicated that third-country financial institutions supporting Iranian trade may face secondary sanctions. OFAC has also restricted the availability of licenses under the Iran sanctions program, creating a presumption of denial for all Iran-related requests outside of certain narrow exceptions.

The EU and U.K. have continued to tighten their sanctions on Iran in parallel. Non-U.S. banks, traders and other financial intermediaries — particularly in the Gulf and Asia — should consider assessing their Iran-linked exposure, even where it is indirect. We expect the U.S., EU and U.K. to maintain their current approach to Iran sanctions while the conflict persists.

3. Enforcement is becoming multi-agency, multi-tool and multi-jurisdictional.

In the U.S., the Department of Justice (DOJ) is pairing civil forfeiture’s lower evidentiary burden with OFAC designations to seize assets — particularly digital assets — that have been linked to sanctions violations. This dynamic is illustrated by a September 2026 forfeiture action by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York seeking approximately $61 million in stablecoin traced to Iranian oil sales.

Civil forfeiture actions require neither a criminal conviction nor a U.S.-person defendant, as the action targets the property itself. We expect this trend to continue.

In the U.K., the new enforcement framework under the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) was announced in February 2026. It introduces, among other things, settlement and early account schemes to speed up enforcement action. OFSI is also proposing to double the statutory maximum penalty, to the greater of £2 million or 100% of the value of the breach.

Elsewhere, the U.K.’s Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI) is expected to publish its first enforcement action this year or early next, and sanctions enforcement actions continue to proliferate across the EU member states. Compliance programs and resourcing should be calibrated to this broader enforcement landscape.

4. Circumvention networks and third-country hubs have been the primary enforcement targets.

Authorities are increasingly expanding their focus from the actors that violate sanctions to the infrastructure that enables circumvention — notably shadow fleet vessels and third-country suppliers, including refineries, ports, payment platforms and trading intermediaries.

The EU’s 21st package expanded vessel designation criteria to capture:

  • Ships providing bunkering.
  • Tug and ship-to-ship services to designated vessels.
  • Targeted entities in China and Hong Kong, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates for enabling circumvention.

Iranian, North Korean and Russian shadow banking systems remain a priority for financial institution compliance programs. Companies should expect heightened scrutiny of transshipment and payment flows involving these and other hubs, including Central Asia and Southeast Asia, and should review distributor, end-use and end-user diligence procedures.

5. Digital assets remain a focus for sanctions compliance and enforcement.

The EU’s 21st package listed 14 cryptoasset service platforms and created a mechanism to prohibit all transactions with cryptoasset service providers established in designated third countries — a tool that is currently dormant but could take effect for an entire jurisdiction’s crypto sector at once.

In the U.S., stablecoin issuers’ freeze-and-burn capabilities, reinforced by the GENIUS Act, allow regulators and law enforcement to reach non-U.S. actors with minimal U.S. contacts. Exchanges, virtual asset service providers and digital asset issuers should consider reviewing their suite of compliance tools, including their use of blockchain analytics, geolocation and other controls to confirm their approach is consistent with regulator expectations.

6. Export controls continue to complement sanctions as an alternative regulatory tool to advance national security.

Export controls, particularly over artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors and other dual-use technology, are increasingly important in advancing national security and strategic competition objectives. For example, the EU’s updated annex to its Dual-Use Regulation includes certain semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment and materials, advanced computing integrated circuits and ceramic matrix composites.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an interim final rule on November 16, 2026, that would expand AI-related export controls over U.S. graphics processing units (GPUs). BIS has also extended the suspension of its Affiliates Rule to January 10, 2027. Should the Affiliates Rule come into effect, companies dealing in U.S.-origin items may face exposure to unlisted subsidiaries of listed parties.

Meanwhile, China’s export licensing for critical minerals and other inputs requires Western firms to audit upstream dependencies, as export controls and countersanctions interact in practice.

7. Divergence and conflicts of law are a day-to-day operational reality.

While the U.S., EU and U.K. remain largely aligned on broader strategic goals, regulatory divergence has increased in the past two years — from wind-down periods to the treatment of particular sectors and technologies.

Court proceedings in jurisdictions that do not recognize Western sanctions are giving rise to conflict-of-laws challenges, as are circumstances in which sanctions in one Western jurisdiction conflict with those in another jurisdiction. The EU has responded by broadening nonrecognition of Russian court and administrative decisions, expanding anti-suit and anti-enforcement orders, and widening damages-recovery rights.

Globally integrated businesses should consider adopting broad-based recusal policies, tailored contractual clauses and jurisdiction-specific controls where sanctions regimes conflict.

8. Sanctions are increasingly dynamic, but sanctions relief still carries risk.

Authorities have shown greater willingness to use delistings and general licenses to advance national security and foreign policy priorities. In Venezuela, the U.S. has issued targeted sanctions relief incrementally through general licenses focusing on particular sectors of the economy. In Syria, international sanctions have been lifted or rescinded almost wholesale.

Relief can be withdrawn as quickly as it is granted, and residual restrictions often remain in place for some time. Licensing itself is maturing as a tool, with authorities licensing complex transactions in coordination with one another.

9. Economic security tools are converging; siloed compliance is a potential liability.

Sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance are converging in practice, particularly for financial institutions with direct or indirect exposure to international shadow banking networks. We expect governments to continue merging those tools into broader economic security regimes. Where appropriate, organizations should seek to break down internal silos between anti-money laundering, sanctions and export controls, and consider a more integrated approach to trade and financial crime compliance.

10. Technology, data-driven enforcement and whistleblowing will help shape the next phase.

Regulators are adopting intelligence-led models, using trade data, vessel tracking and corporate registry analytics to detect red flags before any self-disclosure is filed, while broader whistleblower incentivization remains under review in the U.K. As AI-powered tools facilitate the review of huge volumes of data across disparate sources, firms will increasingly be expected to identify issues that are visible in public data.

At the same time, companies deploying AI in their own compliance functions should consider exercising careful prioritization, governance and attention to data protection rules and privilege considerations. Organizations should also consider ensuring that speak-up or whistleblowing channels, internal audits and technology-enabled screening are robust enough to identify or prevent potential breaches early.

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1 This client alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Complex assessments often have to be made regarding which sanctions regime applies in any given instance, given the multinational touchpoints of many entities and individuals. In that regard, given the complex and dynamic nature of these sanctions regimes, there may be developments not captured in this summary. Additionally, while the summary was accurate when written, it may become inaccurate over time given developments. For all of these reasons, you should consult with a qualified attorney before making any judgments relating to sanctions, as there are potentially severe consequences for failing to adhere fully to sanctions restrictions.

This memorandum is provided by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws.

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