On February 25, 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in Google Android Auto1 that a dominant platform’s refusal to ensure interoperability with a third-party app may constitute an abuse of dominance. The court further noted that this may be the case even if that platform is not indispensable for the app’s commercial success.
The key points from the CJEU ruling are:
- A lowered bar for finding an infringement: If a dominant company allows third-party access to its asset (such as a digital platform) and later hinders access for particular third parties, this is likely to be unlawful. However, if the asset was created solely for the company’s own use, refusal will be unlawful only if the asset is “indispensable” for competitors’ activity in a downstream market.
- There is no need to demonstrate that competitors were actually excluded from the market: The fact that the company requesting access was able to grow despite lack of access to the dominant platform provided no justification in the Google case. Regulators and courts need to assess all relevant circumstances.
- Possible justifications for refusing interoperability: A dominant company can lawfully deny interoperability if it threatens the platform’s integrity, security or is technically impossible. Without such justification, the dominant company must enable interoperability within a reasonable amount of time.
Background
Android Auto software was developed by Google and allows users to access certain smartphone features through a car’s integrated display. To ensure and simplify interoperability, Google offers templates for entire app categories, allowing third-party developers to create Android Auto-compatible versions of their apps. Initially, templates were available only for media and messaging apps, while Google’s own non-media/messaging apps (Google Maps and Waze) were compatible with Google Android Auto.
Enel X’s JuicePass app helps users charge electric vehicles by finding and booking charging stations and navigating to them via Google Maps. The app also manages the charging session and relevant payments.
In 2018, Enel X asked Google to make JuicePass compatible with Android Auto. Google refused, stating that only media and messaging third-party apps were supported. A subsequent request was also denied, with Google citing security concerns and limitations regarding resources in creating a new template.
Enel X filed a complaint with the Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)), claiming Google’s actions amounted to an abuse of dominance in violation of Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). During the AGCM’s investigation, Google released a beta template for charging apps that was compatible with Android Auto.
In 2021, the AGCM found that Google had abused its dominant position. It ordered Google to release a final template for electric charging apps and to ensure JuicePass was fully compatible with Android Auto, imposing a fine of over €100 million. Google first appealed the decision to the regional administrative court, which dismissed the company’s claim, after which Google then appealed to the Italian Consiglio di Stato, the highest administrative court in Italy, which made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.
The CJEU’s Ruling
The CJEU, sitting in its Grand Chamber composition, held:
1) A dominant platform’s refusal to ensure interoperability with a third-party app can be considered an abuse of dominance if the platform was not developed exclusively for the needs of the dominant company and was instead designed to be shared with competitors. The court ruled that this holds true regardless of whether the platform is essential for the third party’s commercial operations and that it is sufficient — for purposes of proving an abuse claim — that compatibility with the dominant platform enhances the third party product’s appeal to consumers.
The 1998 ruling in Bronner set the standard for when a refusal to supply is considered abusive, emphasizing that such cases are rare and require careful balancing of interests.2 The ruling also stated that companies’ right to contract, property ownership, and incentives to invest and innovate must be protected, and that forcing businesses to share assets with competitors on demand could discourage efficiency and long-term growth. As a result, the Bronner indispensability condition applies only when there are no alternative products or services to using a dominant company’s infrastructure and it is impossible or unreasonably difficult for a downstream company to create such alternatives.3
However, in Google Android Auto, the CJEU found that when a dominant company develops infrastructure not solely for its own use but also to enable third-party access, the Bronner indispensability condition does not apply. In such cases, the court ruled that protecting contractual freedom, property rights or investment incentives does not justify restricting access. Notably, the court also ruled that if the company already grants access to some third parties, extending such access to others does not fundamentally change its economic model.
2) The fact that a company requesting access (or a competitor without access) managed to remain active on the market and even grow their position, despite lack of interoperability, does not exonerate the dominant company. To prove abuse of dominance, the court ruled there is no need to show exclusion. However, there must be tangible evidence that the practice is capable of producing such effects.4 The CJEU ruled that evidence showing that the JuicePass app remained attractive to electric vehicle users despite not being compatible with Android Auto could be relevant, and courts therefore need to take into account all relevant factual circumstances.
3) Even if access to a platform is indispensable, a refusal to provide access or interoperability can be justified and thus may be lawful.5 A dominant company may argue that providing interoperability could impact the platform’s security or integrity, or that other technical limitations make interoperability impossible.
4) Difficulties in granting access are relevant but not decisive. The CJEU made clear that the absence of a template for a specific app category or the difficulties in developing one cannot, on their own, justify a refusal to grant access. However, a reasonable delay in developing the template and implementing interoperability may be justified. This should account for the requesting company’s needs and challenges involved in creating the template. Courts should assess: (i) the technical complexity, (ii) resource limitations (e.g., staffing) and (iii) external factors, such as regulatory requirements. In addition, the dominant company needs to actively engage with the requesting company. If the dominant company fails to respond to a request for interoperability, it could be seen as evidence that the refusal is not objectively justified.
5) The dominant company may request fair and proportionate financial compensation from the requesting company for granting interoperability. This compensation should reflect the actual cost of development and a reasonable profit margin, and cannot include excessive access fees.
Takeaways
The ruling in Google Android Auto aligns with several recent CJEU judgments that have limited the application of the strict Bronner criteria to a narrow set of circumstances, while also generally broadening the obligations for dominant companies to offer access to other providers (e.g., Slovak Telekom, Lithuanian Railways, Google Shopping). The CJEU’s Google Android Auto ruling emphasizes that the indispensability criterion applies when a dominant company refuses access to an infrastructure created solely for that company’s own use. However, once access or interoperability is granted to third parties, the dominant company may no longer restrict access and may even have to enable access. This is particularly relevant for digital markets, where the key infrastructure involves platforms that not only allow but “encourage third-party developers to create versions of their own apps that are compatible” with them and operate models “in which data and services are shared by a digital platform’s owner with external developers in service to a community of users.”6
The CJEU’s ruling will likely be welcomed by app developers, provided it will not impact decisions made by platform owners regarding when and how to permit access to third parties.
As Advocate General Laila Medina noted, one of “the most delicate issues” in Google Android Auto is that the court requires dominant companies to actively ensure access, such as developing necessary software models. The dominant company in question must not only allow access to its platform, but also invest time and resources to ensure that access is effectively provided.7
When asked to grant access or interoperability to its platform, a dominant company must carefully consider whether access is technically possible and whether this will compromise the security or integrity of its platform. The reasons for rejecting any such request for access will need to be explained in detail. If granting access, the dominant company also needs to inform the requesting company of the time necessary to make the access possible and be able to justify the timeframe.
Finally, Google Android Auto leaves open questions in relation to the scope of access obligations for dominant companies and what may constitute foreclosure. It is yet to be determined, for example, where to draw the line between the applications for which the essential infrastructure was reserved for its owner and the applications for which the infrastructure was intended to be shared with others. It is also unclear whether access can be distinguished between different types of providers or with respect to providers upgrading the scope of their services, including whether the dominant company can still reserve the highest level of interoperability only to its own products. There is also a question as to how the dominant company should deal with multiple access requests received simultaneously when assets are not readily accessible or when there are capacity or resource constraints. It also remains to be seen to what extent the Google Android Auto ruling, adopted in the context of digital platforms, will be transposable to other use cases.
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1 Judgment of 25 February 2025, Alphabet and Others, Case C‑233/23, EU:C:2025:110.
2 Judgment of 26 November 1998, Bronner, Case C-7/97, EU:C:1998:569.
3 Id., para. 41-46.
4 Judgment of 19 January 2023, Unilever Italia Mkt.Operations, C‑680/20, EU:C:2023:33, para. 42 and the case-law cited.
5 See Bronner, para. 41. See also Judgments of 27 March 2012, Post Danmark, C 209/10, EU:C:2012:172, para. 40, and of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company, C 333/21, EU:C:2023:1011, para. 201 and the case-law cited.
6 Google Android Auto, Opinion of Advocate General Medina, para. 37.
7 Id., para. 63.
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