NRSC v. FEC: Supreme Court Invalidates Limits on Political Parties’ Coordinated Spending

Skadden Publication / Political Law Compliance and Investigations Update

Ki P. Hong Charles M. Ricciardelli Tyler Rosen Matthew Bobys Theodore R. Grodek Melissa L. Miles Sam Rothbloom Mason Eiss Jessica Grubesic Kirin Gupta Lucy Kalar Pavla Ovtchinnikova Alexa O. Santry

Executive Summary

  • What’s new: On June 30, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in NRSC v. FEC that Federal Election Campaign Act limits on political party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment, overruling an earlier decision.
  • Why it matters: National parties’ ability to engage in unlimited coordinated expenditures may make them a more appealing recipient of contributions than before, but outside groups like super PACs and 501(c)(4) organizations will still remain popular.
  • What to do next: Organizations should consider ensuring their policies and procedures address joint fundraising committees, which allow parties and candidates to fundraise simultaneously and will likely grow in popularity following the ruling.

__________

On June 30, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission that Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) limits on political party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment.

Background and Holding

FECA limits the amount an individual may give to a federal candidate to $3,500 per election and to a national party committee such as the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) to $44,300 per year for its general account. FECA also limits how much such national party may spend on expenditures that are coordinated with its nominee (e.g., $65,300 for most nominees for seats in the House of Representatives).

Although those coordinated expenditure limits had previously been challenged and were upheld in 2001 in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), the Court overruled its earlier opinion. However, the Court’s opinion was narrower than some observers anticipated and did not change the rules for coordinated expenditures by persons who are not political parties (e.g., super PACs, 501(c)(4) organizations). Thus, restrictions on such outside groups remain in effect.

In analyzing the constitutionality of the restrictions, the Court concluded that limits on party coordination satisfy neither the Court’s “strict scrutiny” test (typically applied to limits on expenditures) nor the Court’s less stringent “closely drawn” test (typically applied to limits on contributions).

Reiterating that the only permissible government interest in restricting political expenditures is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Court held that limits on political party coordinated expenditures satisfied none of the requirements of even the lesser “closely drawn” test, because such limits are disproportionate to and neither necessary to nor narrowly tailored to protect the government’s anti-corruption interest.

The Court was also not persuaded that the expenditure limits were needed to prevent circumvention of the candidate contribution limits. Specifically, the Court identified contribution limits, earmarking laws and disclosure requirements as existing safeguards that are less restrictive and better tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption and circumvention. The Court also emphasized political parties’ role and unique relationship to candidates such that any infringements on their coordinated expenditures result in an outsized burden on “the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.”1

Effect of the Decision

Shifting Landscape

The ability of national parties to engage in unlimited coordinated expenditures is likely to make such parties a more appealing recipient of contributions than super PACs, whose expenditures still may not be coordinated. However, any suggestion that this decision will end or significantly impair donations to super PACs or 501(c)(4) organizations is likely overblown.

The limits on contributions to political parties are high relative to candidate limits but are dwarfed by the unlimited amounts that a super PAC or 501(c)(4) may accept. Moreover, national parties are still barred from accepting corporate contributions. As a result, super PACs and 501(c)(4)s are likely to remain attractive options.

That being said, we can expect to see increased use of joint fundraising committees by which candidates simultaneously raise funds for their own campaigns as well as for party committees with which they can now coordinate on spending.

Potential for Increased Scrutiny

The Court’s references to earmarking and disclosure rules as an important safeguard against quid pro quo corruption and circumvention of limits may mean donors could face increased scrutiny of party contributions, whether by the government or oversight groups, for indications that parties are acting as a “conduit” for contributions directed to benefit a particular candidate or campaign.

State Law Implications

Given the case was decided on constitutional grounds, states with similar restrictions on party activity will need to consider whether they are still enforceable. This will be particularly important in states where the rules for contributions to parties and campaigns differ even more significantly than at the federal level (e.g., if corporate contributions are permitted for parties but not campaign committees, or if there are no limits on contributions to parties).

We will continue to monitor future developments.

1 NRSC v. FEC, 609 U.S. ___ (2026), at 8 (quoting Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 630 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).

This memorandum is provided by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and its affiliates for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. This memorandum is considered advertising under applicable state laws.

BACK TO TOP